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Michael T. Morley*
The presidential nomination process used by the Democratic and
Republican Parties is an ill-considered, unstable pastiche of competing
components that generally operate in fundamentally different manners. The
process is comprised of three main elements: the selection of delegates to
the national convention (generally through state and district party
conventions or other intraparty processes), the determination of the
presidential candidates for whom those delegates will vote (generally
through state-by-state primaries and caucuses), and the national
convention itself.
The ritual of holding primary elections and caucuses across the nation
creates the widespread public expectation that the results of those
proceedings—the will of the voters—will determine who wins each party’s
nomination.
Yet, the national convention need not nominate the
presidential candidate who received the most votes nationwide, won the
most delegates, or prevailed in the most primaries or caucuses. The system
gives delegates substantial power over both the rules of the convention and
the choice of nominee that, were it ever used, could lead to the collapse of a
party. And the mere existence of this power leads to suspicion of the party
establishment, intraparty intrigue and discord, and uncertainty throughout
the primary process, which are unhealthy for both the party and the
country.
The presidential nomination process could be substantially improved
through a few minor tweaks that would reduce unnecessary uncertainty,
bolster its democratic underpinnings, and improve the connections among
its various components. First, certain fundamental rules governing
national conventions should be determined well in advance of the
presidential nominating process, before any primaries or caucuses are held
or delegates selected, and not be subject to change or suspension at the
convention itself. Second, parties should enhance the democratic moorings
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of their national conventions by requiring presidential candidates to win a
greater number of presidential preference votes to be placed into
nomination. Third, state parties should tie the various components of the
presidential nomination process more closely together by adopting a blend
of the Democratic and Republican Parties’ current approaches. When a
candidate is allotted national convention delegates based on the results of a
presidential preference vote, the candidate should have a voice in selecting
those delegates, and those delegates in turn should be bound to vote for that
candidate, at least during the first round of voting at the national
convention.
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INTRODUCTION
Throughout early 2016, as Donald Trump amassed a commanding lead in
the Republican presidential nomination process, many members of the
Republican “establishment” tried to stop him from winning the
nomination.1 By April of that year, it had become mathematically
impossible for any candidate other than Trump to win a majority of bound
delegates to the Republican National Convention through presidential
primaries and caucuses. Senator Ted Cruz and Governor John Kasich
nevertheless remained in the race to try to prevent Trump from reaching a
majority.2 Cruz also lobbied delegates to Republican state conventions to

1. See, e.g., Alexander Burns & Jonathan Martin, Facing Long Odds, G.O.P. Leaders
Map Strategy to Derail Trump, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2016, at A1; Hilary Brueck, An Island
Full of Millionaires Wants to Stop Donald Trump Cold, FORTUNE (Mar. 8, 2016, 8:45 AM),
http://fortune.com/2016/03/08/aei-world-forum-trump/ [https://perma.cc/9A5K-4VXN].
2. See James Hohmann, The Front-Runners Got Their Mojo Back in New York, WASH.
POST, Apr. 21, 2016, at A15; Sahil Kapur, Cruz’s Path to the Nomination Narrows After
New York Walloping, BLOOMBERG POL. (Apr. 20, 2016, 5:00 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-04-20/ted-cruz-s-path-to-the-nominationnarrows-after-new-york-walloping [https://perma.cc/SME4-E9LU].
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select national convention delegates who supported him, even in states
where he had lost the primaries to Trump.3
Cruz and Kasich sought to force a contested convention at which they
could claim the Republican Party’s nomination for President, despite failing
to win the most bound delegates to the national convention, the national
popular vote in the presidential primaries and caucuses, or a plurality of
primaries and caucuses on a state-by-state basis.4 Even after Trump
secured an absolute majority of bound delegates to the national convention,
some opponents continued their efforts to derail his nomination by
attempting to change the convention’s rules as it was convening—after all
of the primaries were complete, votes cast, and delegates selected.5 One
delegate to the Republican National Convention sued, successfully, to avoid
having to vote for Trump.6
The Democratic primaries did not run much more smoothly. Former
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s main opponent was Senator Bernie
Sanders, a self-identified socialist who declared himself to be a Democrat
for the sole purpose of seeking the party’s nomination for President7 and
left the party immediately after losing.8 Months before the first primary
was held, Clinton had secured the support of hundreds of “superdelegates,”9
giving her a substantial advantage and causing Sanders’s supporters to

3. See Seema Mehta & Melanie Mason, Dual Strategies in 2 States for Cruz, L.A.
TIMES, May 1, 2016, at A15; see also Dan Nowicki & Yvonne Wingett Sanchez, Trump
Campaign Irate over Delegate Defeat in Arizona, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, May 1, 2016, at A6;
Jenna Portnoy, Cruz Picks Up 10 Delegates to Trump’s 3 at State GOP Convention, WASH.
POST, May 1, 2016, at C5.
4. See Election 2016—Republican Delegate Count, REALCLEARPOLITICS,
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2016/president/republican_delegate_count.html (last
visited Nov. 19, 2016) [https://perma.cc/HBW2-WEN4].
5. See Scott Detrow, “Never Trump” Campaign Launches Last-Ditch Effort to Stop
Nomination, NPR (July 13, 2016, 4:35 PM), http://www.npr.org/2016/07/13/485895835/
opposition-forces-prepare-last-ditch-effort-to-thwart-donald-trump [https://perma.cc/9MEUEMHR]; Alexandra Jaffe, Campaign to Dump Trump at Republican Convention Emerges,
NBC NEWS (June 17, 2016, 5:57 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016election/campaign-dump-trump-republican-convention-emerges-n594766 [https://perma.cc/
24NY-VT6D].
6. See Correll v. Herring, No. 3:16CV467, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89781 (E.D. Va.
July 11, 2016).
7. See Stephanie McCrummen, The Most Radical Thing He’s Ever Done, WASH. POST,
Feb. 6, 2016, at A1; see also Gabrielle Levy, Sanders: Yes, I’m a Democrat of Convenience,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Mar. 15, 2016, 2:24 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/
articles/2016-03-15/sanders-yes-im-a-democrat-of-convenience [https://perma.cc/F4X5-6E
GF].
8. See Peter Nicholas, The Democratic Convention: Sen. Sanders to Serve Term as
Independent, WALL ST. J., July 27, 2016, at A5.
9. See Charles M. Blow, Opinion, The (Un)Democratic Party, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4,
2016, at A19; Gabriel DeBenedetti, Leaked Memo Shows Clinton Campaign Still Sweating
Bush, POLITICO (Oct. 28, 2015, 7:57 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/10/leakedmemo-hillary-clinton-still-concerned-jeb-bush-215230 [https://perma.cc/D5MZ-8YSZ]. A
“superdelegate” is a current or former Democratic Party official or officeholder who is
automatically deemed a delegate to the Democratic National Convention by virtue of his or
her position and is not bound, pledged, or otherwise required to vote for any particular
candidate. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
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argue that the system was unfairly rigged against them.10 Indeed, as the
Democratic National Convention was starting, the chair of the Democratic
National Committee (DNC), Debbie Wasserman Schultz, was forced to
resign after an email leak confirmed that she and several other senior
leaders had manipulated the entire process to aid Clinton’s nomination.11
These controversies reveal the internal contradictions and risks of
disruption that permeate the presidential nominating process. The process
is an uncomfortable, ill-considered pastiche of two distinct components that
typically operate in fundamentally different manners12: selecting delegates
to the national convention (generally done through state and district party
conventions or other intraparty processes) and determining the presidential
candidate for whom those delegates will vote (generally done through stateby-state primaries and caucuses).13 These competing processes coalesce in
the third critical component of the system: the national party convention.
The ritual of holding primary elections and caucuses across the nation
creates the widespread public expectation that the results of those
proceedings—the will of the voters—will determine who wins each party’s
nomination.14 These public expectations are undoubtedly fueled in part by
a lack of understanding of how the presidential nomination system works,
due both to its complexity and the infrequency with which it is
implemented.15
The national convention, however, need not nominate the person who
received the most primary or caucus votes nationwide, won the most
delegates, or prevailed in the most primaries or caucuses. Indeed, the
convention may decide to nominate someone who did not even run in the
primaries and caucuses at all.16 The process by which many delegates to
the national convention are selected, the virtually plenary discretion those
delegates have over the rules of the national convention, the highly
circumscribed ways in which most delegates are bound by the results of
10. David Weigel, Superdelegates Emerge as Democrats’ Polarizing Force, WASH.
POST, June 8, 2016, at A9; see, e.g., Editorial, Superdelegates, Clarify Your Role, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 20, 2016, at A18.
11. Jonathan Martin & Alan Rappeport, Leaks Bring Down a Democratic Leader, N.Y.
TIMES, July 25, 2016, at A1.
12. See Zachary M. Bluestone, Note, The Unscripted Evolution of Presidential
Nominations: From Founding-Era Idealism to the Dominance of Party Primaries, 39 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 963, 998 (2016).
13. See infra Part I.
14. See, e.g., Blow, supra note 9, at A19.
15. Cf. Michael T. Morley, Dismantling the Unitary Electoral System?: Uncooperative
Federalism in State and Local Elections, 110 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE (forthcoming 2016)
(manuscript at 19–20), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2742719
(explaining how erroneous public assumptions and perceptions can give rise to conventions)
[https://perma.cc/WA7L-NQQH].
16. This possibility is typically referred to as the “white knight” scenario. During the
2016 Republican presidential nomination process, some commentators urged national
convention delegates to nominate Paul Ryan or Mitt Romney, even though neither had run in
the primaries or caucuses. See Alexander Burns, Who Could Save the G.O.P.?: Republicans
Weigh Some Ideas, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/14/us/
politics/republican-nomination.html [https://perma.cc/MUY7-JBBN].
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primaries, and the appointment of superdelegates who are not bound to vote
for a particular candidate all conspire to create a system in which party
elites may act as a check on the popular will and have the power to
determine who receives the nomination.17 When it appears that the system
may operate in this manner, however, public pressure and expectations seek
to force the party to abide by the popular will.18
In short, the system gives delegates substantial power over both the rules
of the convention and the choice of nominee19 that, were it ever used, could
lead to the collapse of a party. The mere existence of this power, moreover,
leads to suspicion of the party establishment, intrigue and internal discord
by factions seeking to defeat the candidate who won the most popular
support in the primaries and caucuses, and uncertainty and instability
throughout the primary process that is unhealthy for both the national party
and the country.20
The system’s structure also reveals deep ambivalence over who actually
constitutes “the party.” “The party” may be understood broadly as
including anyone who chooses to participate in that entity’s presidential
preference primaries or caucuses; in this sense, a party can include people
who have never supported that party’s candidates before and even members
of a competing political party (in states with open primaries). During the
2016 election cycle, many independents tended to support Donald Trump,
leading him to perform much better in open primaries than primaries with
more restrictive participation standards.21
Alternatively, “the party” can refer to party officials and officeholders,
major contributors, and activists who loyally volunteer to assist campaigns
for offices at all levels of government.22 Such people have personally
17. See infra Part I.
18. Donald Trump memorably predicted, “I think you’d have riots,” if he fell 100
delegates short of a majority and was ultimately denied the nomination. See Mark Z.
Barabak, 3 Ways the GOP May Pick Its No. 1, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 26, 2016, at A6. A
Bloomberg Politics survey revealed that 63 percent of Republican primary voters thought
that “the person with the most delegates deserves the party’s nomination, even if he arrives
short of a majority.” Id.
19. See Ross Douthat, Opinion, The Party Still Decides, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2016, at
SR9.
20. See, e.g., Ed O’Keefe, As “Never Trump” Forces Make a Last Stand, Compelling
Scenarios Emerge, WASH. POST, July 14, 2016, at A6; see also Ed O’Keefe, Anti-Trump
Delegates Vow Trouble, WASH. POST, July 17, 2016, at A2.
21. See Janet Hook & Reid J. Epstein, Cruz, Sanders Get Big Wins, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6,
2016, at A1.
22. Even the so-called “party establishment,” of course, does not necessarily act as a
monolith. V.O. Key Jr. explains that party leadership is comprised of the party-ingovernment, or the officeholders who belong to the party, and party organization, referring
to the party activists who engage in campaigning and fundraising. V.O. KEY, JR., POLITICS,
PARTIES, & PRESSURE GROUPS 163–65 (5th ed. 1964). “[B]oth sides of intraparty disputes
usually include a varied mix of like-minded leaders from both the party organization and
party-in-government, cooperating together against rivals along ideological lines.” Michael S.
Kang, The Hydraulics and Politics of Party Regulation, 91 IOWA L. REV. 131, 170 (2005)
(emphasis omitted). Deep schisms can also exist between party officials and front-line
activists. See Hans Noel, Ideological Factions in the Republican and Democratic Parties,
667 ANNALS 166, 177–81 (2016).
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invested in the organization and can perhaps lay greater claim to its longterm stability, reputation, and interests. In the 2016 primaries, these people
tended to support so-called “establishment” candidates such as Governor
Jeb Bush, Senator Marco Rubio, Kasich, and Clinton.23 The extent to
which party elites should be able to overrule the will of others who
participate in presidential preference primaries and caucuses lies at the heart
of most disputes underlying the nomination process.24
This Article contends that the structure of the presidential nomination
system and the rules governing it introduce unnecessary instability and
unpredictability into an already contentious system. It offers basic
proposals for reform that are consistent with nearly any conception of what
a political party is and what the goals of the nomination process should be.
Part I begins by describing the presidential nominating process, exploring
each of its three main components: the selection of delegates to the national
convention (typically at state and district party conventions or through other
intraparty processes), the determination of the presidential candidate for
whom those delegates will vote (typically through state-level primaries and
caucuses), and the actual selection of the party’s presidential nominee at the
national convention. This part further explains how the rules of the national
convention determine key aspects of the overall presidential nomination
process. The most critical rules specify the requirements that a candidate
must satisfy to be eligible for nomination at the national convention, the
number of votes a candidate must receive at the convention to win the
nomination, whether delegates must follow state laws and state party rules
binding them to vote for particular candidates based on the results of their
respective states’ primaries and caucuses, and whether the convention rules
may be suspended altogether. These rules, however, are not definitively

23. See Noel, supra note 22, at 171.
24. See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 236 (1986) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the state’s interest in “protect[ing] the general party membership
against . . . minority control” by the party’s officeholders and candidates).
The system also is poorly tailored to facilitating the selection of a nominee based on
any particular criteria. That is, there is no consensus as to whether a party should seek to
nominate the person who best embodies the party’s principles, the person who is most likely
to win the general election (which, from a public choice perspective, often means the person
most likely to appeal to the “median voter”), or someone who reflects some optimal tradeoff
between these competing considerations. See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF
DEMOCRACY 127–28 (1957). As a result, the primaries and caucuses conducted in each state
often work at cross-purposes with each other, and the national convention cannot effectively
pursue any of those objectives. States with closed primaries and caucuses privilege the
views of party stalwarts. See Democratic Party of the U.S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette,
450 U.S. 107, 122 (1981) (explaining that a national political party has a First Amendment
right to hold closed presidential preference primary elections because the “inclusion of
persons unaffiliated with [the] political party may seriously distort [the party’s] collective
decisions”). The outcomes of those contests are then diluted or nullified by other states’
open primaries, which encourage anyone—even members of other parties—to participate.
See Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 221–25 (holding that a party has a First Amendment right to open
its primary to independent voters, in part because their inclusion can help the party select a
nominee who will appeal to the public); Nathaniel Persily, Toward a Functional Defense of
Political Party Autonomy, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 750, 815 (2001).
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determined until the convention itself, when the delegates vote to adopt the
proposal of the convention’s rules committee.
Part II argues that this system is fundamentally unstable, unfair, and
politically undesirable. The legal and practical effects of primaries and
caucuses are not determined until the very end of the process, after they
have concluded. And those effects are determined by national convention
delegates selected largely through state and district conventions, who may
oppose the candidates who won their respective states’ primaries and
caucuses. The various components of the presidential nomination process
thus do not fit smoothly together but instead foster uncertainty, intraparty
intrigue, public distrust in the process, and the ever-present possibility that
the results of primaries and caucuses will be undermined or ignored, such as
through the nomination of a candidate who did not even participate in them.
This part offers three main recommendations to political parties to
enhance the stability, predictability, and perceived fairness of the
presidential nominating process. First, certain fundamental rules governing
national conventions should be determined well in advance of the
presidential nominating process, before any primaries or caucuses are held
or delegates selected, and not be subject to change or suspension at the
convention itself. Second, parties can enhance the democratic moorings of
their national conventions by amending their rules (which, as discussed
above, should be established well in advance of the nomination process) to
specify that a candidate cannot appear on the ballot at the national
convention unless he or she has won a substantial number of primaries and
caucuses. National conventions should not have the power to completely
disregard the millions of votes cast in primaries and caucuses, effectively
nullifying that component of the process, by nominating someone who
fared poorly or did not even participate in those contests.
Third, and perhaps most controversially, the components of the
nomination process should be tied more closely together by blending the
current approaches of the Democratic and Republican Parties. Each party
should adopt a system in which, as the Democratic rules provide, candidates
may reject individuals seeking to serve as national convention delegates
pledged or bound to them. Each party likewise should adopt the current
Republican requirement that delegates allocated to a presidential candidate
based on the results of a primary or caucus are bound to vote for that
person, at least in the first round or two of voting at the national convention.
This Article does not defend the existing convention-based framework
for nominating presidential candidates. Nor does it contend that its
suggested reforms will perfect that system or resolve the enduring
controversy over the proper allocation of power among party elites, the
party’s rank and file, and people whose only connection to a party may be
voting in its presidential primary. Rather, this Article adopts a more
practical perspective. Recognizing that the current system is the product of
numerous conflicting imperatives and promotes the interests of various
stakeholders, this Article accepts the system’s structure as a given and
suggests ways to minimize the possibility that intraparty conflict will
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needlessly cripple a party’s nominee and undermine the fairness of a
presidential election as a whole.25
I. THE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION PROCESS
The Democratic Party of the United States and the Republican Party of
the United States are responsible for nominating candidates for President
and structuring their respective nomination processes. The national
Democratic Party is governed by its Charter;26 the national Republican
Party is governed by its Rules.27 The Democratic Charter and Republican
Rules each establish a national committee to manage the party’s affairs
between conventions and issue the call to the national convention.28
The call to the 2016 Democratic National Convention recognizes four
types of delegates to the national convention: at-large delegates, district
delegates, pledged election official delegates (PLEOs), and unpledged
delegates (“superdelegates”), each of whom has an equal vote.29 The call
allocates at-large delegates and district delegates (collectively referred to as
“base delegates”) among the states based on a formula that takes into
account each state’s number of votes in the Electoral College, as well as the
total number of ballots cast within that state for the Democratic candidate
for President in the past three elections.30 These base delegates become
pledged to particular presidential candidates based on the outcome of the
state’s presidential primary or caucus.31
25. Due to the limited scope of this Article, I must reserve an analysis of the proper role
of judicial review in the presidential nomination process for future work.
26. DEMOCRATIC NAT’L COMM., Charter of the Democratic Party of the United States, in
THE CHARTER & THE BYLAWS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF THE UNITED STATES 1 (2015)
[hereinafter Democratic Charter], http://s3.amazonaws.com/uploads.democrats.org/
Downloads/DNC_Charter__Bylaws_9.17.15.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TJT-75MU].
27. REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., RULES OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY (2016) [hereinafter
REPUBLICAN RULES], https://s3.amazonaws.com/prod-static-ngop-pbl/docs/2016-RepublicanRules-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/F9M5-S9GY].
28. DEMOCRATIC NAT’L COMM., Bylaws, in THE CHARTER & THE BYLAWS OF THE
DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF THE UNITED STATES 11, art. II, § 1(a)–(c) (2015), http://
s3.amazonaws.com/uploads.democrats.org/Downloads/DNC_Charter__Bylaws_9.17.15.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3TJT-75MU]; Democratic Charter, supra note 26, art. III, § 1;
REPUBLICAN RULES, supra note 27, rr. 1(a), 13. These documents also state that, if the
national party rules, national convention rules, or actions of the national convention conflict
with a state law, the party will disregard that conflicting law. Democratic Charter, supra
note 26, art. II, § 2; see also REPUBLICAN RULES, supra note 27, rr. 14(c), 16(b), 16(d)(3)–
(5). See generally Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975) (recognizing that national party
rules governing the presidential nomination process trump conflicting state laws).
29. DEMOCRATIC NAT’L COMM., CALL FOR THE 2016 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL
CONVENTION art. I (2014) [hereinafter DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION CALL], http://tndp.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09/2016-Call-for-Convention-5.22.15.pdf [https://perma.cc/98W9-2J
DN].
30. Id. art. I(B). Each state’s allocation of base delegates is increased by up to 35
percent depending on when its presidential nomination events are scheduled to occur. Id. art.
I(C)(2). The term “state” is used broadly here to include the District of Columbia, as well as
U.S. territories and possessions. The call assigns jurisdictions that do not participate in the
general election for President set numbers of base delegates in addition to the 3,200 divided
among the states and District of Columbia. Id. art. I(E).
31. See infra Part I.A.
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Each state also receives PLEO slots equaling 15 percent of its total
allotment of base delegates for state, local, and party officials.32 PLEOs
also become pledged to particular presidential candidates based on the
results of the state’s primary or caucus “on the same basis as the state’s atFinally superdelegates automatically qualify as
large delegates.”33
delegates to the national convention by virtue of their current or former
positions and are not bound to particular candidates. DNC members;
Democratic federal elected officials and governors; and former Democratic
Presidents, congressional leaders, and DNC chairs are all superdelegates.34
A total of 4,763 voting delegate slots were authorized for the 2016
Democratic National Convention: 2,650 district delegates, 910 at-large
delegates, 491 PLEOs (making a total of 4,051 pledged delegates), and 712
additional unpledged superdelegates.35
The call to the Republican Convention contained a set of temporary rules
that governed the nomination process until the convention convened and
adopted them as standing rules.36 The temporary rules recognize three
categories of delegates: at-large delegates, district delegates, and partyleader delegates.37 Each state receives ten at-large delegates,38 plus up to
six bonus at-large delegates based on the number of its state and federal
Republican officeholders,39 and additional bonus at-large delegates if the
state voted for the Republican candidate for President in the previous
election.40
Each state also is allotted three district delegates for each of its
congressional districts.41 Finally, each state receives three party-leader
slots designated for particular people: the state party chair, the Republican
National
Committee
(RNC)
committeeman,
and
the
RNC
Delegates are generally bound to particular
committeewoman.42
presidential candidates based on the results of their state’s presidential

32. DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION CALL, supra note 29, art. I(D); DEMOCRATIC NAT’L
COMM., DELEGATE SELECTION RULES r. 8(D) (2014) [hereinafter DEMOCRATIC DELEGATE
SELECTION
RULES],
http://www.demrulz.org/wp-content/files/Proposed_Draft-_2016_
Delegate_Selection_Rules_8_23_14.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CEX-K2ET].
33. DEMOCRATIC DELEGATE SELECTION RULES, supra note 32, r. 9(B)(2).
34. DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION CALL, supra note 29, art. I(J); Democratic Charter, supra
note 26, art. II, § 4(h).
35. DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION CALL, supra note 29, app. B.
36. REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., CALL OF THE 2016 REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION
r. 42 (2015) [hereinafter REPUBLICAN CONVENTION CALL], https://prod-static-ngoppbl.s3.amazonaws.com/media/documents/Call%20of%20the%202016%20Convention_1448
920406.pdf [https://perma.cc/EKP5-4AXU]. Those temporary rules also are included in the
Rules of the Republican Party. See REPUBLICAN RULES, supra note 27, r. 42.
37. REPUBLICAN CONVENTION CALL, supra note 36, r. 14(a).
38. Id. r. 14(a)(1). Jurisdictions that are not states receive set numbers of at-large
delegates, in addition to three party-leader delegates, but no district delegates. Id. r. 14(a)(4).
39. Id. r. 14(a)(6)–(7).
40. Id. r. 14(a)(5).
41. Id. r. 14(a)(3).
42. Id. r. 14(a)(2).
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preference vote.43 Based on these formulas, the RNC authorized 2,472
delegates to the 2016 national convention: 560 at-large delegates, 1,305
district delegates, and 168 party leaders.44
The parties’ presidential nomination processes are similar to each other.
Each is comprised of three components: (1) a method for determining how
many national convention delegates will vote for each presidential
candidate (typically through statewide presidential preference votes, such as
primaries and caucuses), (2) a method for selecting delegates to the national
convention (typically through state and district party conventions or other
intraparty processes), and (3) the selection of a presidential nominee at the
national convention itself.
A. Determining How National Convention Delegates
Will Vote
Most state parties determine how their delegates to the national
convention will vote in the first, and sometimes later, rounds of voting by
holding a presidential preference vote, which may be conducted through a
primary election, caucuses throughout the state, or (rarely) a state party
convention.45 The Democratic Party requires state parties to allocate their
national convention delegates among presidential candidates based on the
results of some sort of presidential preference vote.46 The rules of the
Republican Party, in contrast, specify that if a state party chooses to hold a
43. See infra Part I.A; see also Memorandum from RNC Counsel’s Office to Republican
Nat’l Comm. Members (Jan. 29, 2016), https://www.scribd.com/doc/298879643/Counsel-sOffice-Memo-re-RNC-Member-Binding [https://perma.cc/86YC-X7B6].
44. REPUBLICAN CONVENTION CALL, supra note 36, at 47–58.
45. The District of Columbia Republican Party was the only entity in the 2016 election
cycle that chose to hold a presidential preference vote at a “state” convention (at which it
also selected its national convention delegates). D.C. REPUBLICAN PARTY, DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTIAL CONVENTION AND DELEGATE SELECTION PLAN FOR
THE 2016 REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION §§ II(1), IV(1), V(1) (2015),
http://dcgop.com/2016/wp-content/uploads/DCGOP-2016-Convention-Plan-i-FINAL-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4FXZ-KMR9].
The Republican state parties of Colorado, North Dakota, and Wyoming did not hold
presidential preference votes. North Dakota held a statewide convention to select its national
convention delegates, who were not bound to any presidential candidates. See infra Part I.B;
see also N.D. REPUBLICAN PARTY, STATE COMMITTEE RULES rr. 11, 20 (2016),
https://www.ndgop.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/NDGOP-State-Party-and-ConventionRules-April-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/6HCJ-SP7W].
Colorado’s delegates were not bound to a particular candidate unless they chose to
file pledge forms promising to support that candidate in the first round of voting at the
national convention. COLO. REPUBLICAN STATE CENT. COMM., BYLAWS OF THE COLORADO
REPUBLICAN STATE CENTRAL COMMITTEE art. XIII, § A(1)(a), (5)(c) (2015), http://
cologop.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/CRC-Bylaws-9-26-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/V3A
R-B2EQ]. Wyoming selected some of its delegates at a statewide convention and others at
county conventions. See WYO. REPUBLICAN PARTY, BYLAWS OF THE WYOMING REPUBLICAN
PARTY art. IV, § 7(1)(b) (2016), https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/wygop/pages/44/
attachments/original/1474042400/2016.bylaws.pdf?1474042400
[https://perma.cc/8YFL9WYT]; id. art. VI, §§ 4(1)(d), 8(1), 8(4). Candidates for national delegate in Wyoming
were required to pledge themselves to a particular presidential candidate or declare
themselves uncommitted. Id. art. VI, § 8(11).
46. See DEMOCRATIC DELEGATE SELECTION RULES, supra note 32, rr. 10(C), 13(A)–(B).
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statewide presidential preference vote through any of those methods, the
results must be used to bind that state’s delegates to the national convention
in some way (although the state may choose whether delegates are allotted
to candidates on a winner-take-all or proportionate basis).47 States that
choose not to hold statewide presidential preference votes, in contrast, are
not required to bind their delegates.48
State law generally governs the conduct of a state’s presidential
preference vote, but if the law conflicts with the rules of a state or national
party, that party often can compel compliance with its rules,49 subject to
certain ill-defined constitutional50 and other limits.51 In states that hold
their presidential preference votes through primary elections, candidates can
qualify to appear on a party’s primary ballot in different ways.52 Some
states automatically grant ballot access to anyone who is “generally
advocated or recognized in national news media throughout the United
States” as a candidate for President.53 Some allow, either in addition or in
the alternative, the chair of each major state party to submit a list of
presidential candidates for inclusion.54 Most states permit candidates to
47. REPUBLICAN RULES, supra note 27, r. 16(a)(1).
48. Id.; see supra note 45.
49. Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 491 (1975) (holding that a national party
convention had the First Amendment right to refuse to seat delegates who were elected
pursuant to state law, on the grounds their election violated party rules); see also Eu v. S.F.
Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 229–30 (1989) (holding that a state cannot
regulate the “organization and composition of official governing bodies” of a political party);
Democratic Party of the U.S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 126 (1981)
(holding that a state law may not bind national convention delegates to vote in accordance
with the results of a presidential preference primary conducted in violation of the national
party’s rules).
50. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 663–64 (1944) (holding that the Equal Protection
Clause prohibits a state Democratic Party from excluding African-Americans from its
primary elections, because the state’s involvement in conducting primaries makes the party
“an agency of the State in so far as it determines the participants in a primary election”); cf.
Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 573 (2000) (appearing to limit constitutional
constraints on political parties to the prohibition of intentional de jure racial discrimination).
51. Eu, 489 U.S. at 231 (holding that “a state may enact laws that interfere with a party’s
internal affairs when necessary to ensure that elections are fair and honest” and “impose
restrictions that promote the integrity of primary elections”); see, e.g., Morse v. Republican
Party, 517 U.S. 186, 228–29 (1996) (holding that a state party’s decision to impose a fee for
voting in a presidential preference primary was subject to the preclearance requirements of
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, rather than a constitutionally protected decision under the
First Amendment); Am. Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 781 (1974) (“[T]he State may
limit each political party to one candidate for each office on the ballot and may insist that
intraparty competition be settled before the general election by primary election or by party
convention.”); cf. Marchioro v. Chaney, 442 U.S. 191, 197 n.12 (1979) (declining to address
whether a state may both prescribe the composition of a state party’s central committee and
require it to perform certain election-related tasks for the party, such as selecting its national
convention delegates and presidential electors).
52. See generally Election 2016—Republican Delegate Count, supra note 4.
53. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 53, § 70E (2013); accord MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 8-502
(West 2013); NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-614 (2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-5-205 (2013); WIS.
STAT. § 8.12 (2013).
54. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 103.101(2) (2014); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-193 (2013); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 53, § 70E. In states that rely exclusively on this method, the state party
leadership has virtually unreviewable discretion over whether a candidate may appear on the
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qualify for the presidential preference primary ballot by submitting petitions
signed by a few hundred or thousand party members from that state.55
Several jurisdictions allow candidates to simply pay a filing fee.56
Jurisdictions also vary greatly in terms of who may participate in a
party’s presidential preference vote.57 Some states hold open primaries in
which each voter chooses the party primary in which they will vote and
need not formally join the party to do so.58 In semiopen primaries, each
person has similar flexibility to choose the party primary in which they
wish to participate, but the act of requesting a party’s ballot is treated as
registering with, affiliating with, or promising to support that party.59 Other
states hold closed primaries, in which only people who had previously
joined the party may vote,60 or semiclosed primaries, in which both party
members and independent voters may participate.61 Caucuses exhibit
comparable variations.62
Generally, the results of a state’s presidential preference vote determine
the number of delegates from that state who will be pledged or bound to
each presidential candidate at the national convention.63 The Democratic
Party’s “Delegate Selection Rules” require each state party to allocate
delegates proportionately among all presidential candidates who receive at

presidential preference primary ballot, giving the institutional party establishment
tremendous influence over the shape and course of the primary. See Duke v. Massey, 87
F.3d 1226, 1234 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that David Duke was not entitled to appear on the
ballot in Georgia’s presidential preference primary because the state party leadership decided
to exclude him).
55. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-242(A)-(C) (2013); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT.
§ 5/7-11 (2013).
56. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 34-732 (2008); W. VA. CODE § 3-5-8(a)(1) (2013).
57. Some states establish the eligibility requirements for participating in presidential
preference votes in their laws. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-467(B); FLA. STAT.
§ 101.021. Others expressly provide that each state party’s rules shall determine eligibility
or take precedence over state laws concerning eligibility. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 17-137(a), -101 (2013); ARK. CODE ANN § 7-7-307(a) (2011). Even when state law determines the
type of primary that will be used, state parties have a First Amendment right to insist that
nonmembers be excluded. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574–75 (2000);
Democratic Party of the U.S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Folette, 450 U.S. 107, 125–26 (1981).
Conversely, a party may demand that the state allow independents to participate in its
primary. See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 225 (1986). The First
Amendment does not grant parties a comparable right, however, to demand that members of
other parties be allowed to participate in their presidential preference votes. See Clingman v.
Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 587 (2005). In some states, whether as a matter of state law or the
parties’ rules, both parties hold the same type of primary; in others, each party holds a
different type of primary.
58. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 115.397 (2014); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-13-1010 (2013);
see also GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-224(a).
59. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-7-115(b) (2013).
60. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 101.021; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-7(C) (2013).
61. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-467(B); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 53, § 37 (2013).
62. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 34-732 (2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-3301(a)–(c), -3304
(2013).
63. Some states allow voters to select “no preference” in the presidential preference
vote, which would result in delegates being unbound to any particular candidate. See, e.g.,
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 53, § 70E.
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least 15 percent of the vote.64 At-large delegates and PLEOs must be
allocated based on the statewide vote totals,65 while each congressional
district’s delegates are allocated based on the results within that district.66
The Republican Rules allow for much greater variation among
Republican state parties.67 Many state parties allocate all of their delegates
based solely on the results of the statewide vote. Some use a winner-takeall system, in which the presidential candidate who receives the most votes
on a statewide basis receives all of that state’s delegates.68 Others allocate
delegates proportionately among the candidates based on the results of the
statewide vote,69 often only among candidates who receive at least a certain
percentage of the vote, ranging from 10 to 20 percent.70
Several Republican state parties have adopted a hybrid approach: the
modified winner-take-all format. In such states, a candidate who wins more
than a certain percentage of the statewide vote (typically, a majority)
receives all of that state’s delegates; if no candidate reaches that threshold,
delegates are awarded proportionally.71 Nearly two dozen state parties
apply their winner-take-all, proportional, or modified winner-take-all
systems separately to all of their delegates;72 at-large and party leader
delegates are allocated based on statewide vote tallies, while district
delegates are allocated based on the results within their respective
congressional districts.73
64. DEMOCRATIC DELEGATE SELECTION RULES, supra note 32, rr. 10(C), 13(B), (E).
65. Id. r. 13(E).
66. Id. r. 13(B).
67. See generally REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., 2016 PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATING PROCESS
(2016),
https://prod-static-ngop-pbl.s3.amazonaws.com/media/documents/2016%20
PRESIDENTIAL%20NOMINATING%20PROCESS%20BOOK_1443803140.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Y64D-9GZG].
68. See, e.g., N.J. REPUBLICAN STATE COMM., RULES GOVERNING THE SELECTION AND
ALLOCATION OF DELEGATES TO THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION r. 5 (2016), http://
www.state.nj.us/state/elections/2016-results/2016-delegate-selection-plan-republican.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S4AJ-ME9T]; REPUBLICAN STATE CENT. & EXEC. COMM. OF OHIO,
REPUBLICAN STATE CENTRAL AND EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF OHIO PERMANENT RULES
art. X, § 1(d) (2015), https://www.scribd.com/doc/305765837/Ohio-Republican-Party-Rules9-18-15 [https://perma.cc/XWS5-54YG].
69. See, e.g., REPUBLICAN STATE CENT. COMM. OF IOWA, BYLAWS art. VIII, § 1 (2015),
https://www.iowagop.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/RPI-Bylaws-Updated-2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JF82-RAA3].
70. See, e.g., KY. REPUBLICAN STATE COMM., OFFICIAL RULES OF THE REPUBLICAN
PARTY OF KENTUCKY r. 8.04 (2011), http://rpk.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/OfficialRepublican-Party-of-Kentucky-Rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/GF73-DCB2].
71. See, e.g., MICH. REPUBLICAN STATE COMM., RULES FOR SELECTION OF DELEGATES
AND ALTERNATES TO THE 2016 COUNTY, STATE, AND NATIONAL CONVENTIONS r. 19(C)
(2014),
http://www.migop.org/assets/files/Rules_for_the_Selection_of_Delegates_and_
Alternates.pdf [https://perma.cc/NG5K-JP9H].
72. See, e.g., WASH. STATE REPUBLICAN PARTY, RULES FOR PRECINCT CAUCUSES AND
FOR ELECTION OF DELEGATES TO THE STATE CONVENTION AND NATIONAL CONVENTIONS
r. 37(A)–(B) (2015), http://seattlegop.org/2016_WSRP_rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7X8-E3
M7].
73. The Republican Rules specify that state parties that hold presidential preference
votes before March 15, except for Iowa, New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Nevada, must
use this system. REPUBLICAN RULES, supra note 27, r. 16(c)(1), (c)(3).
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The parties also take very different approaches to what it means for a
delegate to be allocated to a presidential candidate. The call to the
Democratic Convention specifies that delegates are merely “pledged” to
particular candidates and does not provide a mechanism for enforcing those
pledges at the convention.74 Again, much more variation exists among
Republican state parties.75 In most states, a bound delegate is required to
vote for the specified candidate only in the first round of balloting at the
national convention.76 In many other states, binding extends only to the
first two rounds of voting.77 A few state parties require their delegates to
vote for candidates throughout all rounds of balloting, unless released by
that candidate, or certain other contingencies occur.78 Binding applies only
to voting directly on the party’s nomination for President; it does not extend
to other matters that may impact the nomination indirectly, such as the rules
of the convention, platform issues, or credentialing disputes.
Some state rules do not specify how binding is enforced. Others provide
that, if a delegate votes contrary to his or her binding at the national
convention, the chair of that state’s delegation must announce and report
that vote as if it had been cast for the required candidate.79 The Republican
Rules also act as a backstop to enforce state-level binding requirements.
They require convention officers to treat delegate votes cast contrary to
binding requirements in the applicable state party rules or statutes as if they
had been cast for the proper candidate.80
B. Determining Who Will Serve
as National Convention Delegates
The second main component of the presidential nomination process is the
selection of delegates each state party will send to its national convention.
74. See DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION CALL, supra note 29, art. VIII, § F(3)(e); cf. id.
art. VIII, § F(3)(c). As discussed in the next section, the rules indirectly attempt to ensure
that delegates vote consistently with their pledges by giving presidential candidates a limited
right to approve the identity of delegates seeking to be pledged to him or her. See infra Part
I.B.
75. See Reid J. Epstein et al., Republican Convention’s Delegate Math Explained, WALL
ST. J. (May 5, 2016, 10:05 AM), http://graphics.wsj.com/elections/2016/rnc-conventiondelegates/ [https://perma.cc/UDE3-ET9P]; Jessica Taylor, Here’s a Round-by-Round Guide
to a Contested GOP Convention, NPR (Apr. 21, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/
2016/04/21/474581419/heres-a-round-by-round-guide-to-a-contested-gop-convention
[https://perma.cc/42U9-U7CJ].
76. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-243(B) (2013); IDAHO CODE § 34-736 (2008).
77. See, e.g., REPUBLICAN PARTY OF TEX., GENERAL RULES FOR ALL CONVENTIONS AND
MEETINGS r. 38, § 10(b) (2016), https://www.texasgop.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/
2016-Rules-7.14.15.pdf [https://perma.cc/9HXW-HSDW].
78. See, e.g., ALA. REPUBLICAN EXEC. COMM., 2016 PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE PRIMARY
RESOLUTION para. 9 (2016), http://algop.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/2016-PresidentialPreference-Primary-Resolution.pdf [https://perma.cc/M88S-DBK3].
79. See, e.g., id.
80. REPUBLICAN RULES, supra note 27, r. 16(a)(2); see also id. rr. 37(b), 40(d). In a
conflict between a state party rule and a state law concerning binding, the state party rule
would govern. See Correll v. Herring, No. 3:16-CV-467, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89781
(E.D. Va. July 11, 2016); see also Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1952).
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This stage typically occurs within a state after the results of its presidential
preference vote are known. Both national parties’ rules require that at-large
delegates be selected on a statewide basis, while district delegates must be
selected on a district-by-district basis.81
The Democratic Party requires that the district delegates to be pledged to
each presidential candidate be chosen either through a primary election or a
districtwide caucus or convention comprised of Democrats who have signed
“statements of support” for that candidate.82 Most state Democratic parties
opt for caucuses or conventions. The main difference between these
formats is that district caucuses are fairly open, while the participants at
district conventions typically must be chosen at county or municipal
conventions, caucuses, or meetings.83 Statewide delegates and PLEOs
typically are selected either by the state party executive committee or at a
special meeting of the district delegates, but they also may be chosen at a
state convention.84
Most Republican state parties select their at-large and district delegates at
state and district party conventions, respectively.85 The state and district
conventions may be held on the same day, in which case attendees from
each district select their district delegates first, then reconvene to vote
collectively on at-large delegates.86
The Democratic Party allows presidential candidates to exercise much
greater control than the Republican Party over the identities of delegates to
be pledged to them. Anyone wishing to run to serve as a delegate to the
Democratic National Convention—regardless of how a state selects its
delegates—must pledge his or her support to a particular presidential
Each presidential
candidate or declare themselves uncommitted.87
81. DEMOCRATIC DELEGATE SELECTION RULES, supra note 32, r. 8(C); REPUBLICAN
RULES, supra note 27, r. 16(d)(9). The Democratic rules allow district delegates to be
allocated among, and chosen within, political subdivisions smaller than congressional
districts. DEMOCRATIC DELEGATE SELECTION RULES, supra note 32, r. 8(C).
82. DEMOCRATIC DELEGATE SELECTION RULES, supra note 32, r. 12(G); see also infra
notes 97–98 and accompanying text.
83. DEMOCRATIC DELEGATE SELECTION RULES, supra note 32, r. 12(G)–(H).
84. Id. rr. 9(C), 10(B).
85. See, e.g., id. rr. 10(C), 13(A)–(B). Both at-large and district delegates to the
Republican National Convention may be chosen by state and district party conventions, the
state party committee, a primary election, or some other procedure already in use in that state
(pursuant to a grandfather clause). REPUBLICAN RULES, supra note 27, r. 16(d)(1).
86. As noted earlier, both parties allow at least some national convention delegates to be
both chosen and bound to particular presidential candidates through presidential preference
votes (i.e., primaries). Cf. supra Part I.A. In the Democratic Party, only district delegates
may be selected through primaries. DEMOCRATIC DELEGATE SELECTION RULES, supra note
32, r. 10(B); see id. r. 9(C). In the Republican Party, both statewide and district delegates
may be chosen through primaries. REPUBLICAN RULES, supra note 27, r. 16(d)(1).
In these states, the name of each person seeking to become a delegate to the party’s
national convention appears on the party’s primary ballots, along with the name of the
presidential candidate to whom that potential delegate wishes to be pledged or bound
(although some states allow a candidate for delegate to specify that he or she is
“uncommitted” or holds “no preference”). See N.J. REPUBLICAN STATE COMM., supra note
68, r. 5(B)(1)–(2).
87. DEMOCRATIC DELEGATE SELECTION RULES, supra note 32, r. 12(B).
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candidate then reviews the list of national convention delegate candidates
from that state seeking to be bound to him or her and may reject anyone
they wish, so long as certain minimum numbers of delegate candidates
remain.88
Very few Republican state parties formally give presidential candidates
influence over the selection of potential national convention delegates
seeking to be bound to them. Presidential campaigns sometimes engage in
extensive whip operations at state and district conventions to ensure the
election of national convention delegates who support them.89
Additionally, in some jurisdictions, the ballots at the state and district
conventions will indicate the candidates for delegate whom each
Republican presidential candidate has endorsed.90
C. The National Convention
During the late summer of each presidential election year, the
Democratic Party and Republican Party each hold a national convention
where they select their respective nominees for President. Both parties’
conventions have a rules committee, to determine the convention’s rules,
and a credentials committee, to resolve disputes concerning whether certain
delegates were properly chosen.91 These committees have tremendous
power over the course of the convention and are typically the focus of most
efforts to manipulate a convention’s results.
Each Democratic Convention committee is comprised of 162 “base”
members, allocated among the states according to the same formula used to
apportion base delegates, as well as an additional twenty-five PLEOs.92
The DNC’s Executive Committee selects the PLEOs,93 chair, and vice chair
for each committee,94 giving the institutional party substantial influence
over the committees’ activities. Each state’s committee slots are allocated
among the presidential candidates according to either that state’s
presidential preference primary results or the distribution of that state’s atlarge delegates.95 A presidential candidate may submit one or more names
for each slot allotted to him or her;96 the national convention delegates from
that state are required to select committee members from among those
Thus, presidential candidates can effectively dictate the
names.97
membership of each committee; the committee members they nominate
need not even be convention delegates.98
88. Id. r. 12(D)–(E).
89. See, e.g., supra note 3 and accompanying text.
90. See, e.g., D.C. REPUBLICAN PARTY, supra note 45, § VII.
91. DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION CALL, supra note 29, art. VII; REPUBLICAN RULES, supra
note 27, r. 41(a).
92. DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION CALL, supra note 29, art. VII(A)(1)–(2).
93. Id. art. VII(B)(2).
94. Id. art. VII(F)(1).
95. Id. art. VII(C)(1).
96. Id. art. VII(D)(2).
97. Id. art. VII(B)(1), (D)(2).
98. Id. art. VII(A)(3).
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For the Republicans, each committee is comprised of two delegates from
each state.99 The chair of the RNC appoints the committees’ chairs and
cochairs.100 Each state’s national convention delegates decide among
themselves which of them will serve on a committee.101
Shortly before a national convention opens, the credentials committee
prepares a proposed report, identifying everyone who should be recognized
as a delegate to the convention and containing resolutions addressing any
challenges to delegates’ elections or credentials.102 The secretary of the
convention also prepares a temporary roll of convention delegates, listing
the people who will be permitted to vote until the credentials committee
report is approved as the permanent roll of the convention.103 The rules
committee likewise convenes shortly before the convention to craft
temporary rules to govern the convention until the delegates adopt
permanent rules.104
When the convention begins, the credentials committee report is brought
to the convention floor. Delegates on the temporary roll vote on the
report,105 except a delegate may not vote if the report resolves a challenge
to his own appointment.106 When the report is adopted, the delegates it
identifies are deemed the permanent roll of the convention, entitled to vote
on all subsequent matters. Control of the credentials committee is
important because, in a tight race, its recommended decisions can swing the
majority from one presidential candidate to another.
The rules committee report, containing the temporary rules of the
convention, is then presented to the floor. The delegates vote on whether to
adopt them as permanent rules.107 A convention’s rules determine
numerous key aspects of the nomination process.
99.
100.
101.
102.

REPUBLICAN RULES, supra note 27, r. 41(a).
Id.
Id.
DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION CALL, supra note 29, art. VII(I)(1); id. app. A, § 10;
REPUBLICAN RULES, supra note 27, r. 27(a). Any challenges to Republican delegates must
first be filed with the RNC’s Committee on Contests. REPUBLICAN RULES, supra note 27,
r. 25(c). The Republican National Convention’s Credentials Committee is effectively an
appellate body available to review the RNC’s determinations. Id. r. 25(b).
103. DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION CALL, supra note 29, art. VIII(B); REPUBLICAN RULES,
supra note 27, r. 22(a). In the Democratic Convention, the temporary roll reflects the
Credentials Committee’s recommended resolutions of any contests and determinations of
which delegates should be seated. DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION CALL, supra note 29,
art. VIII(B)(1). In the Republican Convention, the temporary roll contains the names of all
delegates who the state parties have certified to the RNC were selected but does not reflect
subsequent determinations about their eligibility or resolutions to other delegate-related
contests or challenges by the RNC or the Credentials Committee. REPUBLICAN RULES, supra
note 27, r. 22(a).
104. DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION CALL, supra note 29, art. VII(H)(1); see REPUBLICAN
RULES, supra note 27, rr. 27(a), 42.
105. DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION CALL, supra note 29, art. VIII(B)(2); see REPUBLICAN
RULES, supra note 27, rr. 22(a), 27(a).
106. DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION CALL, supra note 29, art. VIII(C)(1)(c); see REPUBLICAN
RULES, supra note 27, r. 22(b).
107. DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION CALL, supra note 29, art. VIII(C)(1)(c)–(d); REPUBLICAN
RULES, supra note 27, r. 42.
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First, the rules set forth the requirements for a presidential candidate to
have his or her name submitted to the delegates to be voted upon (“the
Candidate Qualification Rule”). The rules of the 2016 Democratic
Convention require a candidate to submit a petition signed by at least 300
delegates from at least six jurisdictions, with no more than fifty delegates
from any jurisdiction.108 If a delegate attempts to vote for a candidate who
has not been properly placed into nomination, that vote is counted as
“Present.”109 The Republican Rules specify that a candidate may be placed
in nomination if he or she “demonstrate[s] . . . support” from a majority of
delegates from eight or more states, though that number is being reduced to
five beginning with the 2020 convention.110
Second, each party’s rules specify the percentage of votes a candidate
must receive to be deemed that party’s nominee for President (“the
Nomination Rule”). The 2016 rules of both parties’ conventions require a
candidate to receive the votes of a majority of convention delegates to win
the nomination.111
Third, the rules discuss how, if at all, delegates’ pledges or binding will
be enforced (“the Binding Rule”). The Democratic rules do not bind or
otherwise compel delegates—including so-called “pledged” delegates—to
vote for particular candidates. They provide that a delegate’s vote must be
counted “without regard to any state law, party rule, resolution or
instruction binding the delegation or any member thereof to vote for or
against any candidate or proposition.”112 The Democratic system seeks to
avoid the need to bind delegates by ensuring that each candidate has the
opportunity to approve delegates who wish to pledge themselves to him or
her.113 This procedure creates a strong likelihood that delegates allocated to
particular candidates will voluntarily choose to vote for their respective
candidates at the national convention.
The Republican Rules, in contrast, specify that a state’s delegates must
be bound by any statewide presidential preference vote that occurs in a
primary, caucus, or state convention, unless voters directly chose the
delegates themselves in a primary.114 The basis upon which delegates are
bound to candidates (i.e., proportional allocation or winner take all) is
determined by either state party rules or state law.115 Likewise, the number
of rounds of voting at the national convention in which the delegate must
vote for a particular candidate, and the circumstances under which that
108. DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION CALL, supra note 29, art. VIII(C)(6)(b).
109. Id. art. VIII(C)(7)(c).
110. REPUBLICAN RULES, supra note 27, r. 40(b).
111. DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION CALL, supra note 29, art. VIII(C)(7)(b); REPUBLICAN
RULES, supra note 27, r. 40(d).
112. DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION CALL, supra note 29, art. VIII(F)(3)(e); cf. Democratic
Charter, supra note 26, art. IX, § 10 (providing that delegates may not be compelled to vote
in a manner contrary to the candidate preference they expressed at the time they were elected
as delegates); DEMOCRATIC DELEGATE SELECTION RULES, supra note 32, r. 12(I) (stating the
same).
113. DEMOCRATIC DELEGATE SELECTION RULES, supra note 32, r. 12(D)–(E).
114. REPUBLICAN RULES, supra note 27, r. 16(a)(1).
115. See id.; see also supra Part I.B.

2016]

REFORMING THE CONTESTED CONVENTION

1091

delegate may be released from his or her binding, are determined by the
state party or state statute as well.116 Convention officials enforce this
binding by announcing and recording each delegate’s vote based on the
candidate to whom that delegate is bound; they are prohibited from
“recogniz[ing]” a delegate’s vote if he or she votes contrary to his or her
binding.117
Fourth, both parties expressly authorize motions to suspend the rules,
meaning that delegates may vote to ignore whatever convention rules they
wish (“the Suspension Rule”).118 These rules collectively are the
fundamental cornerstones of the presidential nomination process yet are not
even determined until the end of that process, at the outset of the national
convention.
II. REFORMING THE FUNDAMENTAL INSTABILITY
OF THE NOMINATION PROCESS
The presidential nomination process is fundamentally unstable and
dangerously indeterminate in ways that foster intraparty discord and
undermine public confidence. First, the rules governing each party’s
national convention, which determine the legal effects and other
consequences of states’ presidential preference votes, are determined
toward the very end of the nomination process. Those rules are decided at
the national convention itself after all the primaries and caucuses have been
conducted, votes cast, and delegates chosen. Second, those rules are
determined by national convention delegates who, particularly in the
Republican Party, may very well oppose the candidates who won their
respective states’ primaries and caucuses. Third, the overall structure of the
system ultimately sends conflicting messages to the public about both the
voters’ role and the democratic nature of the process: votes are
constitutionally protected and count in determining the nominee,119 but they
are only protected to the extent party elites decide they should.
Determining the rules and consequences of presidential preference votes
after they already have been held raises serious fairness and due process
implications.120 Moreover, because the beneficiaries of various potential
rules are definitively known at the time those rules are being considered,
they are likely to be crafted almost exclusively for the political benefit of
particular candidates rather than to promote procedural fairness or other
values.121

116. See supra notes 84–89 and accompanying text.
117. REPUBLICAN RULES, supra note 27, r. 16(a)(2); see also id. rr. 37(b), 40(d).
118. DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION CALL, supra note 29, art. VIII(J); REPUBLICAN RULES,
supra note 27, r. 32.
119. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 663–64 (1944) (holding that the Equal
Protection Clause applies to primary elections).
120. See, e.g., Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d 1065, 1075–76 (1st Cir. 1978).
121. Cf. Michael T. Morley, The New Elections Clause, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE
79, 100 (2016) (discussing the importance of developing laws governing elections under a
Rawlsian “veil of ignorance”).
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Additionally, under the rules of the Republican Party in particular, the
disconnect between the processes used for selecting delegates (typically,
party conventions) and the processes used for allocating them to particular
candidates (typically, primaries and caucuses) fosters intraparty discord.
Candidates who fared poorly in primaries and caucuses and were not
allocated many bound delegates may nevertheless continue pursuing their
candidacies by seeking the election of supportive national convention
delegates at state and district party conventions.122
State and district conventions operated by party officials and open only to
party insiders are the least transparent and publicly accessible part of the
presidential nomination process. Yet presidential candidates have a strong
incentive to attempt to take advantage of them to undermine the results of
primaries and caucuses.123 The components of the presidential nomination
process are thus at war with each other, fostering unnecessary and
destabilizing uncertainty over whether, and the extent to which, the
outcomes of ongoing primaries and caucuses matter. Rank-and-file party
members, independents, and even members of other parties invited to
participate in open primaries and caucuses justifiably may feel that party
elites are using them to give a veneer of democratic legitimacy to the
nomination process only to the extent it is perceived to be useful.
Much of the problem stems from the fact that the presidential nomination
process was not rationally designed as a coherent whole but rather reflects a
series of accumulated changes and reforms meant to address particular
problems as they arose. Consequently, it fuses fundamentally different
ways of nominating political candidates—primaries and caucuses on the
one hand, party conventions on the other124—into a patchwork with poorly
stitched seams that are likely to split under pressure. However, assuming
that the system’s overall structure is unlikely to radically change in the
foreseeable future, political parties can enhance the fairness and stability of
the presidential nomination process in the following ways.
A. Entrenching Certain Convention Rules
Most basically, certain fundamental rules governing national conventions
should be determined well in advance of the presidential nomination
process, before any votes are cast or delegates selected. Regardless of
whether constitutional due process restrictions govern national conventions,
fundamental fairness demands that the requirements for winning be
established before an election is held, the votes are cast, and the specific
candidates who will benefit from different possible standards are
definitively known. Neither the public, the candidates, nor the party itself
should have to worry about the national convention delegates changing the
rules at the last minute to facilitate the election of a candidate who did not
122. See, e.g., supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 16.
124. See N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 205–06 (2008)
(discussing differences between the perceived fairness of primaries and conventions).
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fare well in the primaries or, potentially, did not even run in the primaries at
all. The mere possibility of such machinations fosters uncertainty,
intraparty intrigue, and the appearance of manipulation, which are
unhealthy for the party and undermine confidence in the presidential
election process.
In particular, the following rules should be determined in advance of a
presidential nomination cycle and not subject to change at any point during
that cycle, including at the national convention: the requirements a
candidate must satisfy to be placed into nomination and receive votes from
delegates at the national convention, whether state party rules and laws
pledging or binding delegates to vote for certain candidates will be enforced
and the manner in which they will be enforced, the percentage of votes at
the national convention a candidate must receive to win the nomination, and
a prohibition on suspending the rules of the convention.
This reform can be accomplished in two different ways. Most simply, a
national convention in one presidential election cycle can be empowered to
approve the rules for the following convention. Under this approach, each
convention would be governed by the rules adopted at the preceding
convention. This approach would cause the least disruption to the current
system. Presently, when a national convention adopts a set of rules, they
take effect on the first day of the convention and expire the day before the
following convention starts.125 This proposal would simply shift that
timeline by four days; when a national convention adopts a set of rules, they
should take effect the day after the convention ends, and expire the last day
of the following convention. Alternatively, certain basic rules concerning
the selection of presidential candidates at national conventions can be
included in the organic documents of the national parties themselves, such
as the Democratic Charter. Such rules would be placed above the fray of
ordinary convention debate and would not be subject to change at the
convention.
B. Reforming Convention Rules
Political parties should do more to enhance the democratic underpinnings
of the national conventions. Presently, if no candidate goes into the
convention with a majority of delegates pledged or bound to vote for him or
her, the convention’s outcome becomes radically indeterminate. Once the
convention proceeds past the first round of voting, most delegates become
unbound, allowing them to vote for any candidate who is eligible to be
nominated.
Currently, a candidate may appear on the convention ballot if he or she
wins the presidential preference votes in only six states under the
Democratic rules126 and is supported by a majority of delegates from eight
states under the Republican Rules,127 and that number is set to drop to five
125. See, e.g., REPUBLICAN RULES, supra note 27, r. 42.
126. DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION CALL, supra note 29, art. VIII(C)(6)(b).
127. REPUBLICAN RULES, supra note 27, r. 40(b)(1).
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at the next Republican National Convention.128 But the convention remains
free to change or suspend the rules concerning both delegate binding and
the requirements for candidates to be placed into nomination at the
convention. Thus, delegates to the national convention have the power to
nominate a presidential candidate who did poorly in the primaries and
caucuses or did not participate in them at all.
Parties can enhance the stability and democratic underpinnings of their
national conventions by amending their rules to specify that a candidate is
not eligible to receive the nomination unless he or she won substantial
public support in presidential preference votes (generally, primaries and
caucuses). The simplest way of implementing this change is to specify that
a candidate must have received the plurality of the vote in a significant
number of presidential preference contests—perhaps a figure between
twelve and fifteen—to be eligible for nomination.
The notion that a person can secure a party’s nomination for President of
the United States while losing up to forty-two primaries and caucuses
undermines the democratic legitimacy of the nomination system and
threatens to rend the connection between primaries/caucuses and the
outcome of the national convention. Of course, alternate ways of
measuring public support can be devised instead. For example, a candidate
can be required to win a certain percentage of the total popular vote across
all primaries and caucuses or a certain number of bound and pledged
delegates (perhaps 20 percent of the total delegates) to be placed into
nomination.
Even if a party’s primaries and caucuses are not intended to be absolutely
determinative of that party’s presidential nomination process, the very act
of allowing tens of millions of people to participate in them suggests that
their outcomes should at least have a substantial impact on determining the
party’s nominee. Limiting the field of potential nominees to those who
have won widespread support through the primaries and caucuses helps
achieve this delicate balance. And once parties have settled on a revised
rule, it should be locked in well in advance of a presidential nomination
process—as suggested in the previous recommendation—rather than being
left open to revision at the outset of a convention.129
C. Selection of National Convention Delegates
Finally, the components of the nomination process should be tied more
closely together by blending the current approaches of the Democratic and
Republican Parties. Each party should adopt a system in which, as the
Democratic rules provide, the candidate(s) who prevail in a presidential
preference vote have the right to veto any delegates who may be pledged or
bound to them under state party rules or state law.130 Each party should
128. Id. r. 40(b)(2).
129. The parties also should amend their convention rules to provide that delegates may
not vote to suspend the rules. See supra Part II.A.
130. DEMOCRATIC DELEGATE SELECTION RULES, supra note 32, r. 12(B), (D)–(E).
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likewise adopt the Republican Party’s requirement that national convention
delegates allocated to a particular presidential candidate based on the results
of a presidential preference vote be bound to vote for that candidate to the
extent required by state party rules or state law.131 Votes cast contrary to a
candidate’s binding should be treated as if they had been cast properly.
These measures not only would reduce the friction between competing
components of the presidential nomination process but would also ensure
that the tens of millions of votes cast in primaries and caucuses are not
effectively nullified through backroom convention machinations.
CONCLUSION
The 2016 election cycle revealed numerous fundamental flaws at the
heart of the presidential nomination process that came close to undermining
both major parties’ conventions. Establishing certain key rules concerning
the presidential nomination process in advance, requiring presidential
candidates to receive a greater level of public support in primaries and
caucuses to be eligible to receive the nomination, and more closely tying
the selection of national convention delegates to the results of presidential
preference votes would strengthen the nomination system, improve its
legitimacy, and reduce the possibility of intraparty schisms.

131. REPUBLICAN RULES, supra note 27, r. 16(a).

